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SEPARATION OF POWERS: A NEW LOOK AT THE
FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH*

The Supreme Court has used two differing approaches in
analyzing recent separation-of-powers issues: the functionalist
and formalist methods. The Author analyzes the benefits and
flaws of both approaches. In light of the goal of increasinginterbranch negotiation over these issues as an alternative to litigating them, the Author advocates using the functionalist approach. The uncertainty of outcome inherent in the
functionalist approach will lead to problem-solving negotiation
between the branches, thus achieving the desired result.

THE SUPREME COURT of the United States has used two

inconsistent methods of analysis to resolve constitutional separation-of-powers issues: the functionalist and formalist methods.'
With the recent decision of Morrison v. Olson,2 the Court appears
to be reversing its trend toward a formalist method of analysis,'
and returning to the functionalist approach. This Note posits that
the return to functionalism, as displayed by Morrison, is the correct choice - but not for any of the approach's previous rationales. Functionalism is the method of choice because of its positive effect on interbranch behavior. The inherent uncertainty of
outcome that results from functionalism's balancing test encour* The author would like to thank Professors Melvyn R. Durchslag and Jonathan L.
Entin for their ideas and encouragement.
1. For a more complete discussion of the functionalist and formalist methods, see
infra text accompanying notes 8-30.
2. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); see infra note 4.
3. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches To Separation-of-PowersQuestions
- A Foolish Inconsistency? 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 516 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss,
Formaland Functionaln. For an example of the Court's use of the formalist approach, see
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
4. Morrison v. Olsen, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), represents a return by the Court to
the functionalist approach. Morrison presented the question of the constitutionality of the
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. 49,
591 et. seq. (Supp. 1988). The Act contained a provision restricting the attorney general's
power to remove the independent counsel to only those instances in which the attorney
general can show "good cause." 28 U.S.C. 596(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). The Court used the
functionalist method of analysis and concluded that the restriction did not impermissibly
interfere with the President's exercise of "his constitutionally appointed functions." Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620.
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ages problem-solving negotiations between political actors, rather

than the unproductive positional bargaining that may result from
the formalist approach. 6 Problem-solving negotiations help to ensure that political disputes are resolved in the political process,
leaving the courts as a last-resort measure for times when the political processes break down. In addition, this Note answers the

major criticism of the functionalist test: that it lacks any stable
content and therefore is too malleable.'
The first section of the Note explains and illustrates the application of the formalist and functionalist tests. Section II then

examines the perceived benefits and criticisms of each approach.
The third section sets out the reasons for choosing the functional-

ist approach by examining its effects on interbranch behavior. The
fourth and fifth sections address the concerns raised in section II
in light of these effects on interbranch negotiations and behavior.

Finally, section IV concludes that functionalism is the preferred
method, because its effect on the relationship between the legisla-

ture and the executive helps to reach the goal of limited judicial
involvement in legislative-executive disputes.
I.

THE FUNCTIONALIST-FORMALIST DEBATE

During the past fifteen years, there has been renewed debate

and concern over the separation of powers doctrine. The Supreme
Court decisions in United States v. Nixon,' Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,9 Bowsher v. Synar,10 and now Mor-

rison v. Olson," have brought to the forefront the issues involved
in resolving legislative-executive conflicts and the judiciary's role
in this process. 12 In these cases, the Supreme Court has struggled
with two inconsistent methods for resolving separation-of-powers

5. See infra note 62 and text accompanying notes 62-64.
6. See infra text accompanying note 61.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
8. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (Although this case involved an executive-judicial conflict,
it is noted because of its use of the functionalist approach.).
9. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding a provision in the Immigration and Naturalization
Act authorizing the House of Representatives to veto the decision of the Attorney General
to suspend the deportation of an alien, by resolution, unconstitutional).
10. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see infra note 21.
11. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); see supra note 4.
12. For a general discussion of the separation-of-powers debate, see Sargentich, The
Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of Powers, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 430 (1987).
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disputes: the functionalist and formalist methods. 13
A. The Functionalist Method
The functionalist approach is based on an interpretation of
the Constitution that views the separate powers of the three
branches of government as not intended to operate with absolute
independence. The Court has stated that "[w]hile the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."' 4
Emphasizing the checks and balances that operate between
each branch,' 5 a functionalist analysis begins by examining
whether the act in question has impermissibly prevented one
branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.
This involves a determination of what functions of each branch
are involved with the disputed act and how they are realistically
affected. For example, in United States v. Nixon,'6 the Court
weighed the importance of the "general privilege of confidentiality
of Presidential communications in performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice.'1 7 It concluded that "the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of
due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the
courts."'"

13. Id. at 433.
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
15. The theory of checks and balances originates from the characterization of the
Constitution as a scheme of separate powers devised to protect liberty. It assures that at
least two branches of the federal government must cooperate before individual rights or
needs can be affected, or the power of any one branch can be enlarged or reduced. See

generally L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

18-22, 209-400 (2d ed. 1988) (dis-

cussing the independence and interdependence of the federal executive, legislative and judicial powers).
16. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). President Nixon refused to comply with a motion filed by
the Watergate Special Prosecutor to compel the President to surrender tape recordings of
his conversations with members of his staff. The President invoked a claim of executive
privilege and refused to surrender the tapes.
17. Id. at 711-12.
18. Id. at 712 (emphasis added); see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Services, 433 U.S.
425, 441-46 (1976) (where the power of Congress to regulate public access to Executive
Branch documents under the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44
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When determining whether the core function of a branch has
been impermissibly interfered with, the functionalist test emphasizes flexibility and balancing by examining the entire framework
of relationships between the branches. 19 This is perhaps the most
difficult aspect of the functionalist test. Critics have shown that
the functionalist advocates on the Supreme Court misapply the

test by focusing their inquiry on a narrow set of relationships
rather than on the entire framework of relationships between all

relevant actors.20
Courts apply the functionalist approach to limit their role in
resolving interbranch disputes. In Bowsher, Justice White argued
in his dissent that "the role of this Court should be limited to

determining whether the [challenged act] so alters the balance of
authority among the branches of government as to pose a genuine

threat to the basic division between the lawmaking power and the
power to execute the law."21

He rejected the majority's position that Congress' removal
power automatically made the Comptroller General an agent of
Congress. 2 Justice White defined the issue in Bowsher in functionalist terms: "The question to be answered is whether the

threat of removal of the Comptroller General for cause through
joint resolution .

.

. renders the Comptroller sufficiently sub-

servient to Congress that investing him with 'executive' power can
be realistically equated with the unlawful retention of such power

U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1987), was found to be not unduly disruptive of the functions of
the Executive Branch).
19. See Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 3, at 520.
20. Professor Strauss has noted that:
While [White] insists on functionalism [in Bowsher,] . . . he fails . . . to carry
through with an inquiry addressed to the whole range of circumstances informing functional analysis. . . . [Hie looks only at the discharge provisions and not,
as a functional analysis should insist, at how they sit in the general framework of
relationships among the GAO [General Accounting Office], Congress, President,
and courts.
Id.
21. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 776 (1986). Bowsher involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. V
1987), for deficit reduction. The Act provided that if the federal budget deficit exceeded
the maximum amount set by the Act by more than a certain amount, the Comptroller
General had the power to authorize across-the-board cuts to reach the prescribed levels.
The Court struck down the Act as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to retain removal authority, other than impeachment, over an officer entrusted with executive powers.
Id. at 726-27.
22. Id. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
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by Congress itself . .., After examining the practical effect of
the removal power within the legislative-executive framework,24
Justice White concluded that "[t]he power over removal retained
by the Congress is not a power that is exercised outside the legislative process as established by the Constitution, nor does it appear likely that it is a power that adds significantly to the influence Congress may exert over executive officers ... " Justice
".

White therefore found the "threat to separation of powers .. .
wholly chimerical." 26
B. The Formalist Method
In contrast, the formalist approach is grounded upon the belief that separation of powers doctrine requires that each branch
of government operate with and maintain maximum independence. Formalists argue that the government was divided into
three branches to ensure against tyranny 7 and that the best way
to maintain this protection is to enforce a strict division of labor
between the branches. 28 Thus, the formalist approach seeks to re-

23. Id. at 770.
24. Justice White explained that:
The statute does not permit anyone to remove the Comptroller at will; removal is
permitted only for specified cause, with the existence of cause to be determined
by Congress following a hearing. Any removal under the statute would presumably be subject to post-termination judicial review to ensure that a hearing had in
fact been held and that the finding of cause for removal was not arbitrary. These
procedural and substantive limitations on the removal power militate strongly
against the characterization of the Comptroller as a mere agent of Congress by
virtue of removal authority. . . .[T]he substantial role played by the President
in the process of removal through joint resolution reduces to utter insignificance
the possibility that the threat of removal will induce subservience to the
Congress.
Id. at 770-771 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 771.
26. Id.
27. The Bowsher Court explained:
Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of
government that would protect liberty. The Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate and wholly independent Executive Branch, with each
branch responsible ultimately to the people.
Id. at 722.
28. "The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as
nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility." Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)
(emphasis added).
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solve interbranch conflicts by drawing sharp boundaries between
the branches and defining every act and actor in terms of each
branch's "assigned responsibility." 9
The majority's reasoning in Bowsher v. Synar typifies the formalist approach. In that case, the Court found that the statute at
issue vested the Comptroller General with the executive power to
interpret a law enacted by Congress. It also found that the Comptroller General is an agent of the legislature, because Congress
can remove him or her for cause through a joint resolution. The
Court then concluded that because the legislature may not vest
executive powers in itself or its agents, the Comptroller General
constitutionally may not exercise the executive powers granted in
the statute.30
II.

THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS AND FLAWS OF EACH APPROACH

The inconsistency in the Court's method of analysis reveals
that both approaches have benefits as well as flaws. In order to
understand the repercussions of choosing between the two methods, it is helpful to recognize that the two approaches represent a
conflict frequently found in legal analysis between a predictable
rule and an individualized decision, "between technical positivism
and policy analysis."'"
A. The Formalist Method
Proponents of formalism claim that the method attempts to
draw clear lines, contributing to planning and stability, and
thereby assures the rule of law. They argue that these clear 3lines
2
reduce uncertainty in the resolution of interbranch conflicts.
Such rules, however, create the hazard of inflexibility for
each branch when it must deal with changing political realities. In
fact, the formalist approach often ignores the reality of political
relationships. Critics have noted that while the bright-line simplicity of formalism has understandable allure to judges trying to decide cases and guide future conduct, it is not "successful in

Id.
30. Id.
31. Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 3, at 512.
32. Id.; Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 625-26 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place
of Agencies].
29.
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describing [the] bulk of government as it is."" 3 One scholar has
found that "[c]ourts have been able to reconcile the reality of
modern administrative government and the strict separation-of",1
powers model . . only by blind feats of definition ...
improper
as
constituting
been
criticized
Formalism has also
judicial activism in political disputes or issues of national policy
that preferably are left to the elected branches.3 5 Justice White
voiced this criticism in his dissent in Bowsher:
The Court, acting in the name of separation of powers, takes
upon itself to strike down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,
one of the most novel and far-reaching legislative responses to a
national crisis since the New Deal . . . . [I question] the wisdom of the Court's willingness to interpose its distressingly formalistic view of separation of powers as a bar to the attainment
of governmental objectives through the means chosen by the
Congress and the President in the legislative process established
by the Constitution."6
The flaw of improper judicial activism, as well as the inflexibility
of the formalist approach, counterbalances the ease in decisionmaking that the clear-line drawing aspect of the formalist method
produces.
B.

The Functionalist Method

Perhaps functionalism's greatest perceived benefit is that its
emphasis on checks and balances37 reflects institutional realities.
Functionalism looks at the total circumstances of each legislativeexecutive conflict, making it flexible enough to accommodate both
government's and society's changing needs, while still protecting
fundamental democratic principles.
Some argue, however, that functionalism contains an inherent
tension.3 8 While the functionalists criticize the formalists for rigid
doctrinalism, the application of the functionalist test does require
the assignment of some doctrinal content to the concept of checks
and balances.3 9 When faced with a legislative-executive conflict,
33.
34.
35.
171, 216
36.
37.
38.
39.

E.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 32 at 625.
Id.
Feld, Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. REv.
(1986-87).
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
Sargentich, supra note 12, at 439.
Id. at 439-40.
Id.
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the functionalist approach requires a determination of what functions of each branch are involved, and how they are realistically
effected.40 Judges, therefore, must assign a value to each function
so that they can balance the effect of the action at issue with the
interests of each branch. These value judgments make the application of the functionalist test more difficult.
Commentators also question whether a functional analysis
can provide a judicially manageable standard for resolving separation-of-power disputes.4 ' This is because the test is viewed as being caught in a trap of indeterminacy and analytical manipulation.42 The indeterminacy is blamed on the lack of perspectives or
premises to guide the functionalist test's operation. The outcome
of any balancing test depends on initial judgments concerning how
the interests and values at stake in the contest are to be weighed.
The notion of an ability to balance indicates that there is a prior
common scale of values against which to compare competing
claims.43 Critics note that there is no such scale of values and
standards that assigns weights to various branch functions, nor is
there any guidance for courts when they examine the practical
effect of a proposed action on the balance of power.44 As a result,
the functionalist test is viewed as being too malleable: 45 depending
on how one frames the balancing test, the functionalist approach
can yield conflicting but convincing results."
In response to this problem, it is claimed that the functionalist test needs a framework of values assigned to core branch functions as well as empirical data concerning interbranch behavior to
guide its application. At present, the test is viewed as only being
able to guard against "a sudden demarche, but not against the
'47
step-by-step accretion of 'reasonable' judgments over time.
However, developing a framework by which to guide a functionalist analysis destroys one of its virtues, flexibility, by making it

40. See supra text accompanying notes 14-26.
41. See Entin, Separation of Powers, the PoliticalBranches,and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L. REV. Issue I (in press 1990).
42. Id.
43. Sargentich, supra note 12, at 440.
44. E.g., Entin, supra note 41.
45. Id.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 69-78 (recognizing and rebutting the argument). Compare Justice White's dissent in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 759, 759-76 (1986)
(illustrating the functionalist approach) with Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note

3, at 519-20 (criticizing White's opinion as not broad enough).
47.

Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 3, at 513.
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more doctrinal and hence, formalistic."'
C. Reactions to the Formalist-Functionalist Debate
This analysis reveals that neither the functionalist nor the
formalist method, as currently formulated, is wholly satisfactory.
Some critics have advocated judicial abandonment of executivelegislative separation-of-powers issues, thereby leaving these issues
to the political process.49 They argue that the system of checks
and balances gives the President and Congress sufficient control
over each others' actions, making the system a self-correcting
one.50 In addition, control of each branch by the electorate makes
judicial intervention unnecessary. 1 It is also thought that judicial
intervention is unwise because it wastes the Court's political capital, exposes it to retaliation by the more powerful branches, and
often has been counterproductive. 52
These reasons are attractive on their face, especially when
faced with the problem of finding a principled approach to resolve
disputes between the political branches. But total abandonment by
the courts in favor of the political process is not desirable. One
commentator states that the idea that the political process can
protect the constitutional balance of power in all cases "is deeply
problematic in assessing relations among President, Congress, and
Court. ' 53 The power of the electorate is viewed as being limited.
The same commentator observed that:
[E]lectoral forces [can] inhibit sudden, massive changes [in the
balance of power between the branches], although in times of
emergency

. . .

that may not be true. More significant may be

the accretion of authority or practice in one or the other branch,
.
to the point whereintended capacity to function
54

on the other branch, is substantially impaired.

. .

as a check

Thus, although interbranch disputes between the political
branches ideally should be resolved in the political process, judicial intervention remains necessary. This Note, however, in keep48. See Sargentich, supra note 12, at 441.
49. E.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 263 (1980).
50. E.g., Id. at 273-76.
51. E.g., Id. at 311-13.
52. E.g., Id. at 314-15, 378-79.
53. Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 3, at 515.
54. Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 32, at 620-21 n.194.
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ing with the principle of judicial restraint, suggests that the judiciary should maintain a very limited role. Judicial intervention is
appropriate only when the political process breaks down so that
the system is no longer self-correcting. A need for intervention

would occur, for example, when one branch gains power that may
enable it to impair55 the capacity of another branch to act as a
"check" against it. In order to determine what type of intervention is preferred in the context of separation of powers questions,
it is necessary to return to the formalist-functionalist debate to
find a determinative factor that makes one approach superior. The
method chosen should be the best approach for the .Court when it
must decide the outcome of a legislative-executive conflict, in ad-

dition to helping reach the desired goal of limited judicial involvement in such disputes.
III.

THE ARGUMENT FOR FUNCTIONALISM

This Note proposes that the functionalist approach is the correct method of analysis precisely because of its criticized malleability. Indeterminacy of result in the judicial process encourages
negotiations and compromise between the two political branches,5"
55. See Feld, supra note 35, at 206; Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 32
at 620-21 n.194.
56. This proposition is based on the analysis of human behavior under conditions of
uncertainty known as risk analysis. Under this analysis, individuals and, by analogy, institutions, fall into one of two categories: risk-aversive, and risk-takers. The risk-aversive actor seeks to minimize risk, or uncertainty of outcome, at all times. These individuals will
accept outcomes which yield less satisfaction or utility in return for greater certainty. See
H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMic ANALYSIS 108 (1978). The risk-taker, on the other hand, is
the classic gambler. The risk-taker perceives the value or utility of the desired outcome as
greater than the cost of the risk or uncertainty. Id.
This Note argues that political institutions will be risk-averse when faced with the
specter of judicial intervention by means of the functionalist test. Each branch will have a
definite position that it wants the Court to vindicate. Each branch also sees the other
branch's position as the opposite, an outcome that is viewed as unworkable. Therefore, the
expected value of the desired outcome is high, but the cost of the bet, or the branch's cost
if it loses the suit, may be much higher. This situation will motivate the legislature and the
executive to negotiate to find a middle ground that is acceptable to both. In effect, each
branch will accept an outcome with a lower utility (value) in order to avoid uncertainty.
See generally GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 181-213 (A. Roth ed. 1985)
(discussing the effect of an individual's change in risk aversion); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS § 2.4 (1957) (quantifying the likelihood of risk-taking behavior in
general); M. SHUBIK, A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 15-24
(1984) (discussing the relationship between wealth and risk aversion); Id. at 605-20 (discussion of maximization in the socio-political context); J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR § 4.4 (3d ed. 1964) (economic analysis of the process of choosing among alternatives).
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leaving the court's involvement as a true last-resort measure. In

contrast, a formalist, bright-line approach to solving interbranch
disputes encourages positional bargaining,5" as each branch becomes convinced that it is on the proper side of the bright line.
This positional bargaining leads to confrontation rather than com-

promise, and may force the Court to impose solutions to national
policy disputes that are unsatisfactory to both branches. The effect of bargaining styles on the resolution of interbranch conflicts
has been noted in a similar form, but it has not been applied to
the formalist-functionalist debate.5"

When the functionalist test is applied, the interests of each
branch are weighed against their effect on the ability of another
branch to carry out a constitutionally assigned function.5 9 This encourages each branch not only to state clearly the vital interests at
stake, but to conscientiously formulate arguments concerning the
effect of the act in question on the constitutional scheme of checks

and balances. The functionalist test, therefore, promotes independent legal interpretation. One scholar has noted that if "government officials regarded each branch's views on the separation of
powers as 'law' for that branch - that is, as authoritative within
the branch's jurisdiction - that attitude would help promote conscientious legal interpretation." 60
In contrast, formalism, as applied, encourages each branch to
undertake an inflexible "I'm right, you're wrong" analysis of sepa-

57. Positional bargaining consists of successively taking and then giving up a series
of positions. R. FISHER & W. URY, GE"TING To YEs 1 (1982). Positional bargaining serves
some useful purposes in negotiation. It informs the other side of what you want, provides a
fall-back position in times of uncertainty, and eventually can produce the terms of an acceptable agreement. However, other methods of bargaining can serve these purposes without the disadvantages of positional bargaining. Positional bargaining
fails to meet the basic criteria of producing a wise agreement, efficiently and
amicably. When negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock themselves
into those positions. The more you clarify your position and defend it against
attack, the more committed you become to it. The more you try to convince the
other side of the impossibility of changing your opening position, the more difficult it becomes to do so. Your ego becomes identified with your position. You
now have a new interest in 'saving face' - in reconciling future action with past
positions -making it less and less likely that any agreement will wisely reconcile the parties' original interests.
Id. at 4-5.
58. See Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation In a Government of Laws: The
Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REv. 461, 470, 484,
501 (1987) (effect of bargaining styles on resolution of executive privilege disputes).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
60. Shane, supra note 58, at 501.
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ration-of-powers issues. Each branch becomes preoccupied with
labeling every act and actor so that they can be placed neatly in
one of the branches of government, or with narrowing the previous
formalist decision to its facts. In fact, one commentator notes that:
[T]he branches tend more to intransigent 'positional' bargaining
if their attitude is that only one correct version of [the] . . .law
exists and each branch's position is the articulation of that law.
Bargaining would be more productive if the branches believed
that each branch had the authority to make law within its jurisdiction and that the aim of negotiation is not to settle on one
legal view as binding on both parties. The branches should perceive themselves as negotiating an immediate, concrete problem.
What government needs is a theory of bargaining that steers officials . . . away from the vindication of doctrinal principle and
toward the reconciliation of institutional interests. 61
One theory of bargaining that will promote the reconciliation
of institutional interests without judicial involvement is problemsolving negotiation.6 2 This Note posits that a functionalist approach toward resolving legislative-executive conflicts will create
an incentive to implement problem-solving negotiation. The uncertainty of outcome in the functionalist test creates a disincentive
for litigation and avoids the danger that "negotiations might bog
down if the prospect of ultimate resort to the courts pushes the
branches to view their positions as preludes to litigation, rather
than as attempts to solve immediate problems reasonably. ' 3 In
order to complete the analysis, however, it is necessary to address
the previously mentioned criticisms and benefits of formalism and
functionalism to dispel some notions that have been too easily
accepted.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 501-42 (application of problem-solving negotiation to executive-privilege
disputes). See also W. FISHER & M. URY, supra note 57, at 41-57.
The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the
conflict between each side's needs, desires, [and] concerns . . . .Such desires
and concerns are [also termed] interests . . . .Reconciling interests rather than
positions works for two reasons. First, for every interest there usually exist several possible positions that could satisfy it . . . . When you . . .look behind
opposed positions for the motivating interests, you can often find an alternative
position which meets not only your interests but theirs as well.
Reconciling interests rather than compromising between positions also
works because behind opposed positions lie many more [common] interests than
conflicting ones.

Id. at 43.
63.

Shane, supra note 58, at 529.
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IV. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST FORMALISM

Formalism, with its clear rules, is claimed to contribute "to
planning, stability, even assurance that conduct can and will be
' The previous analysis of how bright-line rules
governed by law." 64
affect interbranch relations reveals that this perceived benefit of
formalism is questionable.6 5 The words planning and stability connote acceptance, that all parties involved agree on what the law
says and when it applies. A formalistic analysis, however, does not
lend itself to acceptance. The parties may agree that if an executive act was exercised by a member of the legislative branch there
would be a violation of the separation of powers. While this is
clear, it does nothing to contribute to planning or stability. The
two branches will now argue positionally either that the act is really a legislative act, or that the actor is really a member of the
Executive Branch. With the discussions framed in this unproductive light, the prospect of judicial intervention grows.
It also is questionable whether formalism assures that conduct will be governed by law. It has been noted that bright lines
invite evasion by their clarity. 6 Professor Strauss has stated:
Much human wisdom is reflected in what is not our failure but
our unwillingness to attempt a full definition of fraud; fraud inheres in the efforts to circumnavigate such definitions as there
may be. And the drafters or interpreters of a Constitution, anticipating and even wishing continuing struggle and irresolution
over the dispersion of political power, could easily foresee a corresponding difficulty
arising out of the attempt to specify per67
mitted allocations.

Thus, formalism merely invites the parties to relabel acts to fit
within the bright lines rather than reaching an agreement before
litigation.
V.

THE CRITICISMS OF FUNCTIONALISM REEXAMINED

The chief criticisms of functionalism can be successfully rebutted. As discussed earlier, functionalism is labelled an unworkable test because careful analysis of institutional behavior can

64.
65.
66.
67.

Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 3, at 512.
See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 33.
Strauss, Formal and Functional,supra note 3, at 512.
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lead to convincing but opposite conclusions.6 8 Bowsher v. Synar"9
is an example. Justice White's functional analysis in his dissent in
Bowsher concludes that the legislature's power of removal of the
Comptroller General poses no practical threat of increasing Congress' power at the executive's expense.1 0 First, no Comptroller
General has ever been removed or threatened with removal. Second, removal is limited to a showing of cause, assuring that Congress cannot act on a whim. Third, because the Comptroller General has only one fifteen-year term of office, Congress has only a
limited ability to influence his or her behavior without the carrot
of reappointment.7 1
A functional analysis of Bowsher provided by Professor
Strauss, however, reaches the majority's result. 2 Unlike Justice
White, who focused solely on the removal procedures of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Strauss undertook a broader functional analysis of the relationships between the Comptroller General and the three branches of government. He found that:
The Comptroller General's relaionships with the President,
from the proposing of his appointment onward, are strikingly
weaker than those that characterize other agencies; the President and the courts both are utterly divorced from participating
in the control of the particular functions under review; and the
relationship between Congress and the Comptroller General is
far more embracive and proprietary than the relationships that
characterize the rest of government. Here one could fairly describe Congress as having appropriated to itself the President's
characteristic functions (and made nugatory those of the
courts) .7

These divergent results do not suggest, however, that functionalism is judicially unmanageable, or that a framework must be
developed to guide the test's application. First, any balancing test
is inherently malleable; the result rests on individual judgments
rather than concrete rules. The contradictory results of Justice
White's and Professor Strauss' functional analyses in Bowsher,
therefore, may be explained by Justice White's incorrect decision
68. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
69. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

70. Id. at 776 (White, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 770-75; See Entin, supra note 41; Strauss, Formal and Functional,supra
note 3, at 501-02.
72. Strauss, Formal and Functional, supra note 3, at 519-20.
73. Id.
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to focus solely on the removal issue, while Professor Strauss applied the functional test correctly. 74 Also, separation-of-powers issues always will require individual judgment at some level. One
commentator notes that, "determining when the institutional capacities necessary to maintain the required tension among Congress, President, and Court have been threatened will rarely be
7' 5
other than a difficult act of judgment."

Second, a framework is not necessary for a functionalist test.
The courts are prepared and competent to define the core functions of each branch and that is the only objective criteria necessary for the test. Any attempt to use empirical data on institutional relationships between the President and Congress would be
problematic. Indeed, the determinative reason for choosing the
functionalist approach is the effect of its inherent uncertainty of
outcome on interbranch behavior. The more structure that is
added to the analysis before it begins, the more predictable its
outcome. This predictability then will decrease the incentive for
productive negotiation, the desired effect on interbranch behavior.
Opposite results, as in Bowsher,71 stem from framing the initial analysis differently - a decision to functionally evaluate one
aspect of a relationship rather than the entire set of relationships.
At most, the functionalist test could require that the initial analy-

sis be framed as broadly as possible to guide its application, as
77
illustrated by Professor Strauss.
CONCLUSION

Given the renewed interest in legislative-executive separationof-powers issues, as exhibited by Morrison v. Olson,78 this Note

74. Id. at 522.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
77. Strauss, Formal and Functional,supra note 3, at 520.
78. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). See supra note 4. The Morrison Court used the functionalist method of analysis and held that Congress' ability to impose a "good cause" restriction on the President's power to remove an official did not depend on whether or not
that official could be classified as "purely executive." Instead, the Court looked at the operation of the removal provision as a whole, and concluded that it did not "unduly trammel
an executive authority," because the President retained ample authority to supervise and
remove the independent counsel. Id. at 2616-19. In addition, the Court concluded that the
Act as a whole did not violate the separation of powers because it did not undermine the
powers of the Executive Branch, or disrupt the proper balance between coordinate branches
by preventing the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. This again is a functionalist analysis because the Court did not simply stop the anal-
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has sought to examine the functionalist-formalist debate in a new
light. When the debate focuses on the effect of a judicial test on
institutional behavior, functionalism is the preferred analysis. Its
positive effect on interbranch relations furthers both the goal of
limited judicial involvement and the larger ideal of a "workable
government" by encouraging legislative-executive cooperation.
Once these benefits are accepted, the perceived benefits of any formalist, bright-line test fall away, and the criticisms of judicial balancing assume less importance. This analysis illustrates that a
seemingly arcane academic exercise can translate into a formula
for practical government.
SUZANNE PRIEUR CLAIR

ysis with a finding that Congress had acted so as to limit executive power. Instead, the
Court inquired as to whether the Executive Branch retained sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the "laws are faithfully executed." Id. at 2620-22.

